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NOTES AND COMMENTS

In Flake v. Greensboro News Co.,15 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina recognized the right of privacy. But there is no indication in
that case as to how the court would hold if confronted with facts similar
to those in the Gouldman-Taber Pontiac case.
EARmiNE L. POTEAT, JR.

Torts-Trespass to Land-Unintential and Non-Negligent
Entry as a Defense
The early English common law imposed liability for trespass upon
one whose act directly brought about an invasion of land in the possession of another. It mattered not that the invasion was intended, was the
result of reckless or negligent conduct, occurred in the course of extrahazardous activity, or was a pure accident; nor did it matter that no
harm resulted. All that seems to have been required was that the actor
did the act which in fact caused the entry.It has been stated by eminent authority that, "The law on this subject is undergoing a process of change. Among the more important
tendencies is the limitation of liability to invasions which are intended,
'2
or negligent, or the result of abnormally dangerous activity."
3
Smith v. Pate presented the North Carolina Supreme Court, for
apparently only the second time in its history, the question of whether
unintentional and non-negligent entry to land constitutes trespass. The
defendant driver's automobile crashed into the plaintiff's building; the
plaintiff sued for trespass to land, without alleging negligence; and the
defendant pleaded unavoidable accident. The trial court struck the
defense, but the supreme court held this to be error on the ground that
unavoidable accident is a valid defense if pleaded.
The first North Carolina case on the subject, Newsom v. Anderson,4
followed the early common law rule. There, the defendant, "without
design or carelessness," cut down a tree on his own land, the top of the
tree falling on plaintiff's land. Plaintiff prevailed in his subsequent suit
for trespass, the court holding that design or carelessness were not
essential ingredients of trespass.
In Smith v. Pate, the court attempted to distinguish the earlier case
-212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) (By mistake the plaintiff's picture was
used for advertising purposes, and, in the absence of allegations and proof of special
damages, the plaintiff was allowed to recover only nominal damages. This has
been North Carolina's only case concerning the right of privacy).
'REsTATEmENT,

ToRTs § 166, comment b (1934).

PaossER, TORTS § 13 (2d ed. 1955).
246 N.C. 63, 97 S.E.2d 457 (1957).
"24 N.C. 42 (1841). In Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371 (1835), it was said
that "every unauthorized, and therefore unlawful, entry into the close of another
is a trespass." This was dictum since the question of accidental entry was not
involved.
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on the ground that unavoidable accident or sudden emergency had not
been shown, but that the damage had resulted from negligence. However, the words of the court in the earlier case were, "There was no
evidence to show that the tree was felled by design or carelessness."
In fact, the trial court had charged that intent or carelessness in felling
the tree would have to be shown; and for this error in the charge, the
defendant's judgment below was reversed. The conclusion seems
and non-negligent
inescapable that both cases involved unintentional
5
entry, yet different results were reached.
However, the present position of the court, taken in Smith v. Pate,
brings North Carolina in accord with what purports to be the weight
of authority on this point.6
WILTON RANKIN
Trade Regulation-State Fair Trade Acts-Trading Stamps
Fair trade laws, enacted in all states except Missouri, Texas, and
Vermont,' permit vertical price fixing 2 contracts between a manufacturer
and a wholesaler or a retailer which establish a fixed resale price of
the manufacturer's product. The acts provide that as soon as one such
contract is entered into with a distributor within a state, all other
distributors on the same level of competition who receive notice of the
contract are bound by it, even though they are non-signers. 3
For the purpose of preventing evasion of the resale price maintenance
contracts, twenty states and territories 4 have specifically prohibited
For an example of another state recently changing from the early common
law to the modem trend, compare Louisville Ry. v. Sweeney, 157 Ky. 620, 163 S.W.
739 (1914); Consolidated Fuel Co. v. Stevens, 223 Ky. 192, 3 S.W.2d 203 (1927)
with Jewell v. Dell, 284 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1955); Randall v. Shelton, 293 S.W.2d
559 (Ky. 1956).
"Except where the actor is engaged in
' RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 166 (1934).
an extrahazardous activity, an unintentional and non-negligent entry on land in
the possession of another, or causing a thing or third person to enter the land,
does not subject the actor to liability to the possessor, even though the entry
causes harm to the possessor or to a thing or third person in whose security the
third person has a legally protected interest."
This Note is not concerned with trespass to person, but it should be pointed
out that unavoidable accident is also a defense to trespass to person. REsTATEMENT,
TORTS §§ 18, 21, 35 (1934).
1 A complete compilation of fair trade laws may be found in 2 CCH TRADE
RBG. REP. (10th ed.) ff 10000-15585 (1956).
2 Both horizontal and vertical price fixing were originally prohibited by the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (Supp. IV 1957),
but vertical price fixing was later exempted from the Sherman Act by the MillerTydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 1957) and the McGuire
Act, 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
'However, some parts of the acts, and generally the non-signer provisions,
have been held unconstitutional in.Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, and Utah.
See Note, 31 N.C.L. -Ev. 509 (1953).
"Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,

